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2ABSTRACT
The Role of Thrift Institutions
In Boston's Housing Markets
by
Randy Keith Vereen
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on
May 10, 1974 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Bachelor of-Science.
Due to its high cost, most housing is purchased and repaired
with borrowed capital. The availability of this borrowed
capital is often the determining input into people's ability
to meet their housing needs. The major source of this
borrowed capital are the thrift institutions. The way
that they distribute those funds to potential borrowers
is one of the most crucial elements in the housing
market. Often the process that they utilize to make the
distribution decisions works against the inner city
borrower. There is evidence to suggest that in many
cases, the lenders actions are artificially conservative.
An analysis of all the institutions operating in Boston
led to important insights in the peculiar nature of Boston's
mortgage suppliers. This led to important concepts of the
way to achieve change in the Boston market. A case study
of one neighborhood thrift institution resulted in documen-
tation of critical problems such as support of absentee-
owners, "redlining", and disinvestment. Several ways
to deal with these problems and influence their correction
are explored.
Thesis Supervisor: Kent Colton
Titlea Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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4INTRODUCTION
Housing's role as the "premier U.S. consumer good" (1)
dictates that the problems of urban housing are of
paramount importance to all concerned about the quality
of life in our cities. Consequently, it is important
that one understand those unique characteristics of
housing which contribute to its distinctiveness as an
economic good and which form the basis for many of its
problems.
If reasonably well built, housing can last for
generations. This durability leads to a situation
where only two to three percent of the total supply
of housing comes from new construction. (2) The remain-
der comes from the existing stock. Consequently, new
construction can not effectively respond to market
demands. The time that it takes to carry new housing
from an idea to occupancy is often measured in years.
This time lag, coupled with the low percentage of the
total stock that new construction constitutes, results
in an extraordinarily stable supply of housing. Con-
sequently, changes in demand are manefested ( at least
in the short run), by changes in the price of housing
rather than immediate changes in supply.
- As the demand for housing rises, so does the cost.
The consumer either pays the increased cost or consumes
less. If he is already consuming the lowest amount
possible, he has no alternative but to allocate an
5increased percentage of his income for housing. There-
fore the very poor must often spend increasingly greater
portions of their incomes on housing to maintain a
minimal level of housing quality. Even moderate and often
upper income people must spend one quarter of their income
on housing. Inner city residents usually have to spend
thirty to thirty-five percent of their income to acquire
even modest shelter.(3)
The total expenditure of housing includes a high
initial cost (if purchased) as well as a continuing outflow
for maintenance and repair. Because housing expenditures
are so great, generally, neither rental housing investors
nor homeowners are able to accumulate enough savings
to purchase housing or to make major repairs. Consequently,
most of the funds for initial purchases and some of the
upkeep funds (significant renovation and repair) do not
come directly from the owner of the property. They are
borrowed from other sources. Without borrowed funds very
little housing would be built, purchased, or repaired.
Therefore, the supply of borrowed capital is the determining
input into people's ability to meet their housing needs.
This results in housing being tied to the credit market
to a degree unmatched by any other consumer good.
Residential mortgages are the largest users of
available credit in the nation. In 1972 mortgages
accounted for 23.7 percent of the total outstanding credit
or $422.8 billion. This is a significant increase from the
6TABLE 25 e Residential Mortgage
Debt Outstanding and Annual
Increase, 1947-1972
(Dollar Amounts in Billions)
Total
Residential Annual Percentage
Year Debt Increase Increase
1947 $ 34.8 $ 5.7 19.6%
1950 55.3 9.1 19.7
1955 102.5 13.3 14.9
1960 161.6 12.0 8.0
1961 176.1 14.5 9.0
1962 192.3 16.2 9.2
1963 211.2 18.9 9.8
1964 231.1 19.9 9.4
1965 250.1 19.0 8.2
1966 264.0 13.9 5.6
1967 280.0 16.0 6.1
1968 298.6 18.6 6.6
1969 319.0 20.4 6.8
1970 338.2 19.2 6.0
1971 375.0 36.8 10.9
1972* 422.8 47.8 12.8
*reliminary.
Source: Federal Reserve Board.
Source: 1973 Savin-s and Loan Fact Book, p. 36
7TABLE 23 e Postwar Growth in Selected Types of Credit
(Billions of Dollars)
Type of Credit 1947 1972* Increase
Total Credit Outstanding .......................... $366.2 $1,783.9 $1,417.7
Residential Mortgage Credit:
One- to Four-Family Homes ..................... 28.2 346.2 318.0
M ultifamily Units .............................. 6.6 76.6 70.0
Total ......................................... 34.8 422.8 388.0
Corporate Bonds ................................ 27.2 200.2 173.0
State and Local Government Obligations ............ 17.2 180.8 163.6
Consumer Credit ................................ 11.6 156.4 144.8
Mortgages on Commercial Properties ................ 9.1 107.2 98.1
Federal Debt ................................... 220.8 344.2 123.4
*Preliminary.
Sources: Federal Reserve Board; United States Savings and Loan League.
Sources 1973 Savings and Loan Fact Book, P. 32,
89.5 percent level of 1947.
As a consequence of both the role of credit in the
housing market and the magnitude of residential mortgage
credit, any influence on the supply of credit often
has crucial implications for housing markets. There are
two major types of actions which result in changes in the
supply of mortgage credit. The first type of actions
are influences on the flow of funds into "financial
intermediaries", institutions which serve as conduits for
the flow of funds from the private investor (saver) to
the borrower. The most significant of these borrowers
are.those seeking funds for real estate mortgages. For
the purposes of this paper the other type of actions is
a more crucial area. It concerns influences on the flow
of funds from the "financial intermediaries" to the
borrower. It is not only, important whether an institution
has funds to lend but also, where the mortgaged property is
located, the identity of the borrower, and the terms of the
loan. Through the determination of these aspects of the
lending decision, the financial institution exerts its
greatest influence on the housing market.
There is one final characteristic of housing that contri-
butes much to the probLems that evolve as financial insti-
tutions attempt to deal with these critical issues in the
lending decision. Once assembled, it is practically
imposible to move housing more than a few feet. Consequently,
it is an economic good whose value is often dictated by a
9variety of external influences, having little to do with
the actual edifice. The -quality of the neighborhood;
identity of the neighbors; and proximity to schools, work,
and other desired services contributes as much to the deter-
mination of the value of housing as do conditions, size, and
type of structure. This creates one of the most difficult
problems for housing investment. Purchasers, sellers,
and lenders are often unable to assess the true value of
the property.
Homeowners, fearful of racial change in a neighborhood,
sell at a lower than actual value. Rumors of the new
location of facilities near-by drastically increase the
value of housing. Confidence in a neighborhood's
ability to maintain its character against external
influences serves to maintain property values. The lack
of ability to understand the many inputs into the value of
housing results in the confusion of the buyer, lender,
and seller; thus creating artificial barriers and influences
in the housing market.
The remainder of this thesis will deal with the nature
of financial institutions and some of the problems that
have evolved around the flow of funds from them into the
housing market. It is an attempt to understand the many
artificial barriers and influences that have resulted from
the policies and actions of these institutions.
Chapter II is a discussion of the inputs into the
mortgage lending decision and possible results that these
10
might have on urban housing markets. There is a discussion
of not only, the major types of financial institutions and
their distinguishing characteristics, but also, the influences
on the amount of available funds within these institutions
for mortgages, and finally, the determinants of the lending
decision and how they effect urban housing markets.
Chapter III deals with the roles of various thrift
institutions in Boston's mortgage supply, based on an
analysis of their portfolio policies from 1965 through
1972. The data offers interesting insights into the
implications of the types of investments chosen, the sizes
of the institutions, the nature of the charters (state vs.
federal), and the role of the regulatory bodies.
Chapter IV is a case-study of the lending policies
of one financial institution in Boston-The Dorchester
Savings Bank. Data on the South Boston Savings Bank is
also offered to help support some of the conclusions.
The result is documentation of some of the practices
such as "redlining" and support of absentee-owners
which were introduced in Chapter II.
Chapter V draws conclusions about the issues that
have been dealt with and offer suggestions for future
action.
11
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THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
The supply of credit for housing is controlled by the
actions of five major types of savings institutions.
Three of these institutions are "depository" in nature-
savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and
commercial banks. In 1972 they accounted for almost
75 percent of all outstanding residential mortgages.
The other two are the so called "contract savings insti-
tutions"--life insurance companies and retirement funds.(4)
Together, these five institutions accounted for over $350
billion in outstanding residential mortgage loans in 1972.
Although they are not a significant supplier of funds for
mortgages, mortgage companies are important because they
originate and service many of the mortgages held by the
other institutions. The following is a discussion of each
of these five institutions, in order of the size of mortgage
holdings.
Savings and Loan Associations
The largest source of funds to the mortgage market
comes from the more than 6,000 small, highly localized
savings and loan associations,(5) whose primary purpose is
to make mortgage loans and to promote home ownership.(6)
Typically associations draw on savings from a relatively
small geographic area and make loans within the immediate
vicinity of the institution.(7)
In 1972 the total residential mortgage holdings
13
TABLE 27 * Mortgage Loans Outstanding, by Type of Lender
and Type of Property, Year-End 1972*
(Billions of Dollars)
Residential Properties
One- to Total
Four- Multi- Commercial Farm Mortgage
Lender Family family Total Properties Properties Loans
Savings and Loan Associations $165.9 $21.2 $187.1 $ 19.2 t $206.4
Commercial Banks ........ 55.7 6.1 61.8 31.8 $ 5.6 99.2
Mutual Savings Banks ...... 41.6 15.6 57.2 10.3 0.1 67.5
Life Insurance Companies .. 22.3 17.2 39.5 31.8 5.7 77.0
All Others ............... 60.7 16.5 77.2 14.1 24.5 115.8
Total .................... $346.2 $76.6 $422.8 $107.2 $35.9 $565.9
Note: Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
*Preliminary
tLess than $50 million.
Source: Federal Reserve Board.
Source s 1973 Savings and Loan Fact Book, Pe 35
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totaled $187.1 billion, and it represented 85 percent
of their total assets.(8) The reason for the large
mortgage-to-asset ratio lies in the traditional charter
requirements and federal tax laws, which dictate that
the practical investments are real estate mortgages.(9)
These institutions are strong supporters of single
family home financing. Three-fourths of their mortgage
portfolios or 63.6 percent of their total assets are for
loans on single family residences.(10)
Savings and loan associations do not actively use
either the Federal Housing Administration or the Veterans
Administration's programs to guarantee or to insure
mortgage loans. As long as the demand from traditional
borrowers is adequate, most associations will not invest
in government-underwritten mortgages because of their lower
return and lengthy processing time.(11) In 1972, 85 percent
of all loans held by savings and loan associations were
conventional. Even though the FHA insured and VA
guaranteed loans were only 14.3 percent of the loan
portfolio, they represented a marked increase from the
5 percent level that prevailed throughout the 1960's.
Most of this increase can be traced to the purchase of loans
rather than the making of new secured loans by the associa-
tions.(12) This results from recent rule changes by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board which allowed them to have 20
percent of their assets in out-of-state holdings. Most of
these out-of-state holdings are FHA and VA loans purchased
from the originators.
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Commercial Banks
The second largest suppliers of mortgage credit
are the commercial banks, by far the largest financial
intermediaries. Their role in the mortgage market is the
most volitile because their greater investment flexibility
coupled with the fact that a significant portion of their
deposits are demand deposits, which are unsuitable for long
term mortgage loans, has made them most responsive to changes
in the money supply. Because of this, in recent years their
relative position in the mortgage market has often shifted
between second and third place in terms of the size of their
total mortgage holdings.(13)
The crucial element in the banks' lending programs is
the demand generated by the needs of its depositors and
those of the local community. If these demands are not
being met by other financial institutions, then commercial
banks will step up their mortgage lending to meet the need,
often at higher rates than those charged by thrift institutions.
When mortgage funds are readily available they will, generally,
funnel their assets into short term loans.(14) Consequently,
only 12 percent of their assets are in mortgage loans.
Probably the most significant role of commercial banks
in housing is not through the maintenance of a large portfolio
of mortgages. Instead, they perform three vital services:
(1) originating residential mortgages for sale to
investors with servicing retained, (2) making construction
loans, and (3) providing "warehousing" loan funds (used
16
to cover the loan from origination to sale in the secondary
mortgage market) for mortgage banking companies.(15)
Mutual Savings Banks
Like savings and loan associations, mutual savings
banks were organized as thrift institutions. While savings
and loan associations had a clearly defined purpose of using
savings to promote home ownership, mutual savings banks were
established with a goal of promoting savings, but for
no set purpose.(16) Nevertheless, they are the third
largest source of funds for housing with $57.2 billion
held in 1972. When the .commercial banks reduce their
activity in the mortgage market the relative position of
mutual savings banks rises to second, just behind the savings
and loan associations in importance.
Mutual savings banks are state chartered and, unlike
savings and loan associations, are located in only 18
states.(17) The slightly more than 500 mutual savings
banks are concentrated in the East, particularly in Iassachusetts
and New York (Massachusetts has 16 percent of all assets held
by savings banks; New York, 55 percent).
Prior to 1950 mutual savings banks were local, or at most
regional lenders. Consequently, because many mutual savings
banks found relatively few desirable mortgages available,
(particularly in the capital intensive East), the total
mortgage holdings were a much smaller portion of assets
than at present.(18)
In 1949 $6.7 billion or 32 percent of the assets were
17
mortgage investments. By 1959 the total mortgage holdings
were $24.7 billion or 71 percent of assets. In 1969 the
figures were $55.7 billion or 75.2 percent of the total
assets.(19) Several changes contributed to this steady
increase in mortgage investment. The first was the intro-
duction of out-of state mortgage lending legislation in
1950, which set the stage for a drastic change in portfolio
make-up. Until that time mutual savings banks were allowed
to make mortgage loans only on property within their immediate
geographic area. Savings banks in the capital-intensive
East often felt that there were not enough desirable mortgage
investments in the local area to warrant a high mortgage
component in the portfolio. This legislation allowed them
to purchase mortgages from originators in other geographic
areas. Consequently, they began to invest in mortgages
in other areas of the country where there was a plentiful
supply of low-risk, high-yeild mortgages. By 1960 total
out-of-state holdings had reached 35 percent of total
mortgage holdings.(20) As a result, mutual savings banks
became a significant force in the national mortgage market,
often at the expense of local areas. When faced with a
decision between an attractive loan in another state and
a somewhat less attractive local loan, the out-of-state
mortgage won. Almost all of the out-of-state loans were FHA
or VA backed. The federal backing created a mortgage that
could be traded sight unsees with a high degree of
confidence. Today mutual savings banks are the largest
18
investors in FHA and VA loans, which account for slightly
more than half of their mortgage portfolios.(21) Secondly,
the yield on mortgages rose in relation to other possible
investments, resulting in an increase in mortgage investment
in all markets.
Life Insurance Companies
In recent years life insurance companies have been
the fourth largest residential mortgage lenders, although
it is not one of the purposes for which they were organized.
Life insurance companies want to achieve the highest
possible yields on the policy-holders' funds which they
hold in reserve in anticipation of future payments of
benefits. They enter into the mortgage market for the
benefit of their policy-holders, not of the borrowers.
Consequently, their entrance is dependent on the relation-
ship between mortgage yields and yields on other types
of investments.(22) When mortgages have a net return as
high or higher than other possible investments, life
insurance companies actively participate in the purchase
and making of mortgages. When mortgage yield is low
they reduce their activities in the market.
The general trend of lending by life insurance
companies has taken the form of forward commitments
for bulk purchases of single family mortgages. (23)
Consequently, they play a relatively minor role in
local mortgage markets-the channeling of funds via
the purchase of loans often made and serviced by mortgage
19
banking concerns, During the late 1960's their holdings in
one to four family residential mortgages declined while
mortgages on large income-producing properties increased
rapidly.(24)
Pension Funds
Pension funds have become increasingly important to the
mortgage market in recent years due to their rapid growth.
Their assets increased by $48 billion (representing
asset growth of 82 percent) between 1962 and 1967.(25)
Their importance is not dictated by the size of their
holdings as much as by the potential size of their holdings.
Since the 1960's they have invested only 6 percent of
their assets in mortgages.(26) Current government
pressure for them to invest more actively in the mortgage
market may result in an increase from the 6 percent level.
Mortgage Companies
Although mortgage companies do not actively maintain
a portfolio of mortgages they, nevertheless, play an
important role in the mortgage market. The primary purposes
of mortgage companies are to serve as a financial
intermediary bringing together the primary and secondary
mortgage markets and the facilitation of the flow of
funds from capital intensive areas to capital short
areas.(27) Typically, the mortgage company negotiates
a committment for the purchase of large blocks of FHA
and VA mortgages and, to a lesser extent, conventional
mortgages from large financial institutions such as
life insurance companies, mutual savings banks, and
20
savings and loan associations.(28) Besides the origination
of the loan often the mortgage company also retains
servicing of the mortgage for a fee which provides their major
source of income. By making groups of mortgages to sell to
investors, mortgage companies make possible large
out-of-state investments by all financial institutions
as well as providing the opportunity for institutions
such as life insurance companies, who favor large investments,
to invest in the residential market.
21
THE FLOW OF FUNDS
Because the availability of financing is a major
input into the housing market it is important to begin
to understand the determinants of the flow of borrowed
funds for housing sales and repairs.
The most important determinant of the amount of
money available for housing is the flow of funds into
thrift institutions. Since World War II, net gains
in savings have been the major, although somewhat volitile,
source of mortgage funds.(29) In general, they have
provided almost half of the funds available for mortgages.(30)
During times when the supply of savings is unpredictable
or demands by other uses reduce the amount of funds
available, flows into the mortgage market decrease.
When the amount of savings rises rapidly, funds for
mortgages increase, often beyond the immediate demand.(31)
The causes of the volatility of savings flow are
rooted in the entire money market. As the supply of
money is tightened, yields on investments other than
savings accounts rise relative to the yields paid by
thrift institutions whose maximum is set by law. Consequently,
the investor often withdraws his funds from thrift
institutions and reinvests in stocks, government bonds,
and other types of investment instruments. This
"disintermediation" has drastic effects on the availability
of mortgages.(32) With less funds available, lenders must
ma.ke fewer mortgages.
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The second largest source of funds for mortgages
is repayments on existing loans.(33) It was not until
the latter half of the 1960's that this source of new
funds became significant. Most mortgages are written
with terms of 20 to 30 years, yet most portfolios turn
over at a fairly steady rate, providing a constant stream
of funds. This turnover is accomplished in three ways:
first the payments on amortized principle; second,
mortgage prepayments; and finally, loan liquidations
which occur when mortgage property is sold.(34) In
more recent years, the practice of selling originated
mortgages to generate new funds has become increasingly
popular with thrift institutions.(35)
The flow of funds from financial intermediaries
is just as important as the flow of funds into these
intermediary in determining the availability of mortgages.
Like individual investors, most financial institutions
have a choice as to investment possibilities. With
the exception of savings and loan associations which are
heavily regulated and to some extent mutual savings banks,
although they are much less restricted than savings and
loans, most financial institutions have no residential
mortgage requirements. Consequently, when the yield
on mortgages is less than that which is available on
other permissible investments, institutions "disinvest"
in mortgages 2ransferring their funds to the higher
yielding investments. This disinvestment includes selling
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current holding in the secondary market therefore tying
up other funds that might have hone into new mortgages as
well as the reduction in the number of new mortgages
made. This situation occurs when there is a "tight money"
market causing other borrowers to bid up the cost of
capital to a level above that which mortgage borrowers
are willing to pay. This along with the general shortage
of funds in thrift institutions due to disintermediation
causes very little housing to be built during periods of
tight money.
The money market is significant to housing not only
because of its effects on the supply of mortgage
funds, but also, for the effects it has on the cost
of housing.(36)
Stringent money conditions result in an increase
in the cost of financing. First the cost of construction
financing which is capitalized as a part of the unit cost,
increases. The net effect is an increase in purchase
price. Secondly, the cost of mortgage financing increases.
The resulting increases in monthly payments cause certain
housing to become too expensive for persons who could have
afforded it under other monetary conditions.
For example, consider a mortgage for $20,000 at 7 percent
for thirty years. The monthly payment required to amortize
the loan is $132.33 and a person with an income of $7940
could afford it. (Assume 20 percent of the income is
reasonable for mortgage repaymen4) If we raise the
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interest rate to 9 percent, the required payment for
amortization is $159.83 and the necessary income of a
person to afford the loan is Q9590. This anal sis assumes
a constant purchase price. More realistically, the
purchase price would increase with a rise in interest
costs resulting in an even more pronounced effect.
(In periods of drastic interest rises and severe shortages
of mortgage funds however, purchase costs may in fact
decline due to a drop in demand.)
Clearly, a significant number of people may be priced
out of the market by the added costs of increased interest
rates.
S
25
THE LENDING DECISION
Most significant for this examination is the method
of allocation of mortgage funds to particular borrowers.
i.e. what are the inputs into the specific mortgage
decision. The evaluation of risks involved is a crucial
input into the mortgage decision. Lenders attempt to
evaluate the risks associated with the use of the property
as security for the loan as well as those associated
with the borrower and his ability to repay the loan promptly.
The outcome of these segments of the risks analysis
determines much of the nature of local housing markets.
Persons who are determined to be bad credit risks cannot
purchase new housing, nor can they repair housing that they
already own. Often the net effect of this analysis is
to deny access by the poor and often lower middle income
inner city residents to decent housing. Secondlyhousing
that is determined to be a high risk property rarely
can be bought, sold or repaired. This often results in
a continueous spiral of neighborhood decay. Once an
area is recognized by leaders as undesirable and declining
the supply of funds disappears. The net result is
further decay of the area and a decline in values because
no one has an effective economic means to enable them
to purchase housing within the area.
Borrower Risk Analysis
The individual risk analysis is based on several
determinations: first, the borrowers ability to repay
26
the loan (the basis of this determination is the potential
borrower's income); second, the expectation of the continuation
of that income; and third, the moral obligation of the
borrower. If there is no history of long term job
stability or if the applicant has only been employed for a
few years the mortgage may be denied. The analysis of
income is somewhat straight-forward with 20-25 percent of
their income being available for housing. The key problem
lies in the determination of what contributes to allowable
income. Often income of women of childbearing age is
discounted. Overtime income and other types of variable
income are generally not counted. The American Savings
and Loan Institute recommends that considerable attention
be paid to the nature of the employment. e.g. unskilled
workers are more apt to suffer layoffs than professional
and government workers, and frequent job changes are, in
general, undesirable.(37) The significant effect of these
policies is to increase the difficulty of lower income
families to obtain mortgage financing. Often their
jobs are less permanent in nature than those of the
upper income person. Spouse's income is as important
to total family income as the husbands, if not more.
Not only must the borrower have the ability to pay,
but he must also exibit a degree of "moral obligation"
towards the repayment of the loan. Lenders base this
on past credit histories, often without bothering to
examine in detail the reasons for apparent bad credit
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reports. Because of the nature of their economic situations,
minor monetary disasters often result in unfavorable credit
reports for low and moderate income families. For
example, consider a moderate income family who is suddenly
faced with a large medical bill. One possible action
that they might take is slow small payments until the
bill is paid. Credit reports then find them to be "slow
payers". Often the bill might have been turned over to
a collection agency, resulting in a further decline in their
credit rating, or if they borrowed money from a
consumer finance company to pay the bill; that too,
would have been shown unfavorably in the credit report as
having to borrow to pay bills.
A conscientious, competent lending officer, who
sincerely desired to effectively evaluate the risks
involved, might discover this in the interview and
interpret the credit report in light of it. More commonly,
the loan would be declined because of an apparent lack
of "moral obligation" to repay the loan.
Evaluation of the Prooerty
More critical to lenders than the borrower's credit
analysis is a determination of the risks involved in lending
on the specific property, which provides the basis
for the security of the loan in event of default.(38)
There are two major issues in the analysis of the
property. First, the specific property is analyzed
in terms of the characteristics of the site; the structural,
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functional, and asthetic qualities of the building
improvements; the rights and utilities included in the
rpoperty; and the relationships of the piece of property
with the price of equivalent properties.(39) Just as
important to the lending decision as the above analysis
is an evaluation of the surrounding neighborhood.
Questions of its stability, age, racial make-up, nature
of its housing market (declining, stable or rising),
and its general physical condition. Together these are
used to acess a value to the property. The lender then
bases, in part, his lending decision on this risk modified
value. He wants to be assured that the difference between
amount of loan and the appraised value of the property
is sufficient to protect his investment.
Currently there are many problems with the delivery
of mortgage services to lower income people of neighbor-
hoods in the urban areas. Many of these problems have
their roots in the ultraconservativeness and lack of
expertise of lending officers.
The American Savings and Loan Institute, in its
book, Lending Pringioles and Practices, has set the
stage for this ultraconservatism and with following
opening segment from the chapter on"Loan Evaluation":
The Associations first line of defense against
lending loss is the selection of sound loans.
In some associations the loan committee (the
loan officers actually responsible for approving
a loan application) occasionally ask the loan
officer who recommended approval of an application
under consideration to defend his recommendation.
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The committee riay even ask him if he would be
willing to take over as ,ort a e should the
borrowrer turn out to be a roor credit risk.
The question may be asked in jest, but it's
a good one. It indicates the degree of care
the loan officer must exercise in his loan
evaluation role% He must act as if he were
lending his own funds.(40)
This attitude towards the mortgage decision can only result
in the lenders seeking to lend only in no risk situations
The effect of this is that only a few loans will be made
in any but the safest suburban areas with rapidly rising
markets. Mlasiel suggests that this attitude is a result
of not only the basic conservatism but also the ignorance
of many financial officers.(41) In fact, " the mortgage
market tends to over compensate for its risks. Lenders
who see lawyers and take proper precautions find that
the high risk premium paid on most mortgages is much
more than necessary to cover the actual loans involved."(42)
While Maisel suggests that the "skilled mortgage officer
does not attempt to avoid all risks," (43) we find that
private institutions continue to be "extremely cautious
about assuming the risks involved in loans in new areas,
loans in new types of construction, loans to groups
which have not had a long borrowing history, loans to
blighted areas undergoing renewal, and loans of longer
terms, or higher ratio than have been traditional in
the industry."(44) A critical effect of their attitude
is to deny access to homeownership to many lower income
people in urban areas. More often than not, they require
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higher loan to value ratios due to their inability to
accumulate substancial down-payments, longer terms, lower
monthly costs, loans to somewhat blighted areas because
housing is often too expensive in other more desirable
areas where the lender has not traditionally operated,
and almost always loans to a group of people who have not
had a long borrowing history.(i.e. those with lower incomes)
Often lenders continue conservative patterns of
decision making even after there is no evidence to support
them. An example of this occured with the GI loan
guarantee program. Many lending institutions have refused
to make 100 per cent GI loans, even though they are
guaranteed by the Veterans Administration for 50 to 60
per cent of the mortgage. The lenders feel that there
is always a moral hazard associated with loans made where
there is little or no equity on the part of the borrower,
Even though the government offered a program to almost
eliminate the risks involved, the conservative attitudes
on the part of lenders kept them from taking part and
as such greatly reduced the potential effectiveness
of the government action. Even after evidence from those
institutions who did make 100 per cent mortgages failed
to support the fear of increased losses most institutions
failed to modify their established lending policies.(45)
What is clear is that although the government may act
to reduce or remove the risks associated with "high risk"
mortgages, it still may not be effective in changing
the basic lending evaluation process and as such the
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potential for opening up mortgage markets is drastically
reduced.
Often the conservativeness and the apparent lack of
expertise or willingness to develop expertise is manefest
by the complete unwillingness of lenders to lend to
certain neighborhoods.
Minority groups have often been written off as un-
desirable lending prospects by lending institutions.
Consequently, home ownership for these groups has been
almost an impossibility.
Often more crucial to urban housing problems has been
the write-off of neighborhood or "red lining" as it is
often called, because banks effectively draw a red line
around an undesirable area and refuse to write mortgages
within the line. Although denied by many lenders, Henry
E. Hoagland and Leo D. Stone, in their text, Real Estate
Finance, have described the process of red lining well.
... In many instances their (lenders) general
knowledge of their potential markets is such
that they can visualize the neighborhood
influences for good or ill as soon as the
address of the property is given them...
using an ordinary map of the city in which they
operate, they may outline the most desirable
part of the city in which they operate in
one color-- perhaps green. Blue may desig-
nate areas that are still good but have passed
their peak values. Yellow may designate
declining areas that are on the downgrade.
Here we find older neighborhoods with obsolete
properties, many of which show evidences
of neglect! Red spots on the man are danger
signs. Absentee ownership and blights of one
kind or another have left unmistakable marks in
the heavy risks assumed by those who finance
properties in such areas.(Emphasis added) (46)
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"Redlining" is referred to in not only the mortgage
and real estate literature, but also by authors such as
Jane Jacobs. In her book, Death and Life of Great
AmerIrica Cities, (47) she. talks about a "Credit Black-
listing" in the Italian North End of Boston. No Boston
bank would make mortgage loans on property in the North
End. Had there not been a unified effort on the part of
the Italian residents of the area to provide both money
for purchase and rehabilitation (along with a co-operative
labor venture for the rehabilitation), the area might
have decayed to a level of abandonment and disrepair
rather than becoming the viable neighborhood that it is
today.
A study of the lending policies of Chicago area
savings and loan associations indicates that there is
significant disinvestment in the inner city as well as
redlining in the older city neighborhoods.(48) The
result has been accelerating neighborhood decay and a
reduction in the cities population-- the middle class
is being driven from the city due to decay which is
aggrevated by the lack of rehabilitation loans and the
unavailability of adequate financing for home ownership.
This refusal of the lenders to sink money into areas
that they believe are declining is a self-fulfilling
prophecy. When the flow of money for rehabilitation
and home ownership loans in an area is drastically
reduced, there is a resulting decline in both the physical
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quality of the buildings as well as the effective desir-
ability of the neighborhood. Because of these major
effects, 'redlining" is the most detrimental of all.
banking policies on the inner city and at the same time
it is the most difficult to prove. Banking regulations
do not require that banks report information on the
geographic location of their investments. A recent
article in the Wall Street Journal suggests that
(W)here data can be gathered, however, the
pattern seems clear--lenders are anxious to
put more money in the newer suburbs where risk
is minimized, even though a large percentage
of their assets may still come from the inner
city.(49)
Although not currently illegal actions such as these,
which have such serious consequences, are irresponsible
on the part of the lending institution.
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ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP
Often it is just as important who a bank lends to
in an inner city neighborhood as to whether they lend
at all. Many institutions find it easier to make m'ort-
gage loans to an absentee owner who has a past history
of mortgages, resulting in easier credit analysis, and
who often borrows larger amounts creating a fairly
significant amount of mortgage business, The consequences
of an institution making the easier choice and lending
to an absentee owner are often drastic to the neighbor-
hood.
It is common for absentee owners to buy property
in particular neighborhoods with the purpose of making
larger profits at the cost of neighborhood decline and
sometimes complete destruction. The first method by
which these profits are extracted is speculation. The
absentee owner purchases a property at a price which may
be above the present market price in anticipation of a
substancial profit either from increased rents or resale
in the near future. Generally, this occurs in areas
where there is an anticipated increase in demand such
as the area surrounding the new University of Massachu-
setts campus in Boston. The net effect is often to make
housing in the area too expensive for resident owners.
Secondly, they engage in "Slumlordism." Here the
investor accelerates the decay of buildings through
inadequate maintaince and repair. The funds normally
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allocated to those services are taken as profits by
the owner who is interested in the short term return.
The net effect is a serious deterioation in the physical
quality in the neighborhood.
Often lenders will lend to absentee owners in areas
where they normally would lend to a resident owner.
The secure credit history of the absentee assures them
that the risks of foreclosure are minimal and therefore
the property risks are of little importance.
Lenders support absentee owners in other ways. They
give them higher loan to value ratio mortgages, often
exceeding the purchase price of the property. They
develop a relationship with large absentee owners, in-
suring very little "red tape" in the mortgage application
and approval process. All of these make absentee owner-
ship an easier and more desirable activity. Lenders
who support such activity do so not as a local neigh-
borhood institution concerned about the quality of life
in the area which it serves, but as a large financial
institution only concerned about making a profit on its
investments.
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SUMMARY
Of all the institutions playing major roles in the
mortgage market, only savings and loan associations
were founded with the expressed purpose of promoting
home ownership. The others enter the market as a result
of the traditionally high yield offered by mortgages
and/or as a service to their depositors who are unable
to attain a mortgage from other sources. In addition
to purposes set forth in original charters of these
institutions, regulations have been put forth that limit
the scopes of their investments to certain areas. The
combination of purpose with regulations is significant
in determining the precise role of these institutions
in the market.
Savings and loan associations with their goal of
promoting home ownership and tight regulations both in
terms of investment types and gepgraphic restrictions
have a very large portion of their assets in single
family loans. Because of this strong support of single
family resident owned mortgages, savings and loan associa-
tions are the most important of all financial institutions
in the housing market. Although limited, their contact
with lower income residential areas is greater than most
other financial institutions.(50) This stems from a
more conservative attitude on the part of banks and other
financial institutions toward home mortgages as well as
a general policy by savings and loan associations to
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make mortgages on smaller, less expensive homes.(51)
Even so, their role may not have always been commendable
and, in fact, in many cases it may have contributed to a
strong degree of neighborhood decline.(52) 4arvell suggests
that they have often been prime supporters of the middle class
exodus from the central city into the suburbs.(53) Even when
they do enter into the inner city housing market, he suggests
that it is often only to support the large absentee landlords
rather than the resident owners for which they were founded.(54)
The unwillingness of savings and loan associations to
utilize the FHA programs has resulted in them making
few loans on low and moderate income housing in the city
since it must often be insured by FHA to overcome traditional
risk analysis. These policies of savings and loan
associations may have resulted in anything but support
of the inner city neighborhood.
Commercial banks, because of their preference for
short-term loans to businesses and individual customers
have entered the mortgage market only when other financial
institutions were not satisfying the mortgage needs of
their regular customers. Although they are the second
largest lender in the mortgage market, their holdings
represent only a small portion of their total assets,
Their activity is most pronounced in smaller capital-short
cities and tops.. In large metropolitan areas that have a
strong supply f capital they tend not to be actively
involved in the mortgage market, Consequently, they are
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less important to the analysis of inner city housing
markets.
Mutual savings banks, in recent years, have actively
invested in mortgages because of their relatively high
yield compared with other types of allowable investments.
They are significant purchasors of large blocks of mortgages
from originators, particularly in other areas of the
country. Many of the residential mortgages that they
have originated are for large income-producing properties.
They do not see the promotion of home ownership as a major
goal.
They are significant in housing markets where they
are located, not only because of the mortgages they make
in that area but also because of mortgages that they
hold in other areas. Most, if not all, of their funds
come from the local area. Any investment of funds in
other areas of the country before the needs of the local
area have been fulfilled is not in the best interest
of the local area. In the areas that have mutual savings
banks they often play an extremely important role in the
local savings market. In fact, they are often the largest
potential supplier of mortgage funds in an area. If they
do not attempt to meet certain local needs, often these
needs cannot be satisfied. Consequently, the lending
policies particularly those towards investment in areas
other than the local area are of crucial importance.
Currently the lending decision is composed of the
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analysis of both the borrower and the property. Both
analyses tend to make use of practices that are more
conservative than need be. (e.g. often inner city
residents must spend 30 and even 35 percent of their income
to obtain decent rental housing, yet lending officers still
use a 20 to 25 percent figure to determine the amount of
money available for housing. No allowance for the fact
that a much larger amount was reasonable in terms of the
family budget in the past is made.) In fact, the lack
of expertise on the part of the lender often results
in a failure to approve a loan when more realistic
methods of risk analysis might indicate that the loan,
although having some elements of risk, in nevertheless
a sound one.
Before the needs of many potential borrowers who are
now denied mortgages can be met, lenders must develop a
more precise methodology of risk analysis. Lending officers
in the inner city must develop an expertise in dealing
with the problems of the inner city resident. They
must discard many of the old concepts associated with
older urban neighborhoods and replace them with an
open mind so that they might evaluate real risks instead
of perceived risks. Chase has suggested that inner city
lenders should weigh the evaluation of the borrower
more heavily than that of the property. (Traditionally,
the property was most important because the property
served as the lenders protection in the event of fore-
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closure.)(55) But in doing so, he must reject some of the
old evaluation techniques and replace them with a more
human, and at the same time more difficult to utilize, set
of criteria. He must be willing to probe into the
reason behind apparent bad credit indications and interpret
those in light of his findings.
In short, the lender should be willing to take an
agressive role in inner city lending. His obligations
to do this is not a legal one, but rather is a moral
one towards the area where his deposits come from. He
must develop the required new methodology as well as
setting policy directives towards reinvestment in the
inner city.
This section has discussed many of the problems and
issues around the flow of funds from the private saver,
through the "financial intermediaries", and finally into
the mortgage supply. As we have seen, the role of the
financial institutions is one of the most crucial in this
process. The remainder of this thesis is an attempt to look
at the role that these institutions play in one local housing
market. We will look at the city of Boston and the institutions
operating there, and in more detail examine one of those
institutions-the Dorchester Savings Bank-and its activities
in one of the neighborhoods in Boston.
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THE BOSTON SITUATION
Thrift institutions, traditionally, have played a major
role in the housing marketplace. Boston has been no
exception to this. Three major types of thrift institutions
are present in Boston: The state-chartered savings banks
and co-operative banks and the federally chartered savings
and loans.(See Chart 1 for the relative size of their mortgage
holdings.) The co-operative banks are the equivalent of state-
chartered savings and loan associations in Massachusetts.
The importance that these institutions gain from the dependence
of the housing market upon their financial resources causes
any investment policies that they have to be significant.
Analysis of the portfolio policy as determined by the annual
reports of the thrift institutions has given considerable
insight into some important trends dealing with the
relative size of institutions, in-state vs. out-of-state
investments, and variances in individual institutions'
willingness to invest in certain types of assets.(56)
The current trend towards domination of financial
markets by a limited number of large institutions is
clearly evidenced by an examination of Boston-based
lending institutions. One half of the savings banks
in Boston have more than 90 percent of the total
combined assets of all Boston savings banks.(See Chart 2,)
These institutions also account for 26 percent of the assets
held by the 171 savings banks in Massachusetts. The
co-operative bank situation is much the same. Twelve
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CHART 1
This graph depicts the relative size of the mortgage
holdings of the major types of thrift institutions in
Boston. The shaded area depicts those holdings that
in state-regulated institutions. The unshaded area
represents those holdings in federally chartered and
controlled institutions. (1972) Total assets in mortgages
are $3803 million.
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CHART 2
This graph depicts the relative size of the assets of
Savings Banks located in Boston. The numbers in parentheses
indicate the actual percentage of the total assets of all
savings banks in Boston that the particular bank accounts
for. Total assets are $4084.2 million. (1971)
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of the twenty-three co-operatives in Boston control 85 percent
of the total assets of all Boston-based co-operatives.
(See Chart 3.) Federal savings and loan associations
in the city follow the same pattern with one half of
the federal savings and loan associations controlling
86 percent of the outstanding mortgage loans held. by all
Boston-based savings and loans.
This phenomena is present is a more dramatic form.
The eight largest savings banks in Boston (out of 16)
have 67 percent of the combined real estate mortgages
held by Boston-based savings banks, co-operative banks,
and federal savings and loan associations. It is the
policies of these few banks that determine much of the
nature of mortgage availability in Boston. Only 48
p.ercent of their assets are held in in-state mortgages.
Clearly, this group of institutions should be one of the
main targets of efforts in the mortgage market. These
banks have had a more agressive investment pattern than many
of the smaller institutions. This agressive policy causes
them to be more responsive to the economy as they choose
investments. Since 1965 they have tended towards more
liquid investments such as bonds, government obligations,
FHA and VA insured mortgages, notes and personal loans,
rather than long term conventional mortgages. One
possible outcome of this could be a shortage of conventional
monies resulting in a disproportionately applied limitation
on the number of conventional loans being given to lower
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This graph depicts the relationship between the assets
of all Boston-based co-operative banks and the assets of
each individual bank. The data is from 1972. Note that
the numbers in parentheses are the actual percentage of the
total assets that each bank accounts for. Total assets are
$595.3 million.
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income as well as to minority members, who are often
at the bottom of the opportunity scale.
It can be speculated that the larger institutions are
more agressive in their portfolio. investments because
they are more skilled in profit maximization. They do
tend to invest in a greater variety of assets as well as
varying from the norm in terms of levels of investments
in particular assets. They not only invest in the tried
and true real estate mortgages but also in bonds, govern-
ment securities, stock in other financial institutions,
and even bonds and notes that are not to be used to
satisfy legal reserve requirements. It is clear that
the only reason for the latter investment is profit.
Even in their real estate portfolio they experiment
with various combinations of the possible types of loans
available to them as they attempt to maximize profits.
The co-operative banks are a particularly good example
of this. The two largest co-operative banks account
for 41 per cent of the combined assets of all co-operatives
in Boston. Yet they have 88 per cent of the combined
total of co-operative investments that are not legal
for reserves, 90 percent of the combined investment
in other bank stock by co-operatives, 69 per cent of the
investments other than mortgages held by co-operatives,
and slightly less than 38 per cent of the real estate
mortgages held by co-operatives.
One would expect that the largest institutions would
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be best suited for the making of low downpayment mortgages.
The skills of their staffs should be well suited to some
of the special problems associated with evaluating and
making low downpayment mortgages. Although there is
no appreciable increase in risks with a low downpayment
mortgage (the part of the mortgages above the standard
percentage (80%) must be insured) banks often cite
"risk" as the reason for their undesirability. The
diversified asset portfolio of the larger banks should
allow them to absorb any increase in risks with relative
ease. This does not appear to be happening. The two
largest co-operative banks make almost no 90 per cent
mortgages while many of the smaller co-operatives have
5-10 per cent of assets in this type of loan. Often
it is only through this type of loan that a low income
family has access to homeownership. Lending institutions
which fail to make these types of mortgages are, in fact,
preventing the reality of homeownership for people with
limited incomes who cannot aquire a substantial amount
of cash for a downpayment.
Out-of-state FHA and VA loans play an important
part in the portfolios of the large institutions.
Because out-of-state loans are purchased from a maker
in another state the lender becomes an investor who invests
in this riskless mortgages without having to evaluate
them on an individual basis. He becomes less of a
mortgage maker and more of a financial investor seeking
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the highest yield on his investment. The selection
criteria becomes one of only yield since the government
backing removes the question of risks. The three largest
savings banks account for 52 per cent of the combined
assets of all Boston-based savings banks, yet they have
62 per cent of the out-of-state loans and 42 per cent
of the in-state loans held by savings banks in Boston.
Any continuation of a trend towards increased investment
in this area would have very serious consequences on
the mortgage market in Boston. The first result would
be a fund drain. i.e. Money invested in Boston would
supply mortgages in other states at the expense of
Boston residents. Secondly, financial institutions could
move out of the mortgage market entirely, being content
merely to purchase and sell mortgages much as they
would any other type of liquid asset. "Mortgage brokers"
might become much more common. It is possible that
these new mortgage makers might be much more conservative
than financial institutions have been as they seek the
highest return on their investment.
One of the most significant findings of this analysis
was the extent to which state-chartered institutions
dominate the savings and , consequently, mortgage market.
89 percent of the mortgages held by,8oston-based thrift
institutions are in state-chartered institutions.
Statewide, 75 percent of mortgages are held by state-
chartered institut -ns. This is extremely different
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from the situation in most areas of the country where
federally chartered savings and loan associations tend
to dominate the market.
This situation has a-very important implication.
There is a shift in the level of regulatory action from
the national to the state and local level. Changes in
Boston's situation must be accomplished through changes
in state law and state regulatory policy. Consequently,
national movements to change federal laws and regulations
often have only marginal implications for Massachusetts.
Their grea-test effect is to set precedents for actions
at the state level in Massachusetts. This state-dominance
of thrift institutions offers IMassachusetts an as yet
untapped opportunity to solve many of the problems in the
local mortgage market without having to wait for the
federal government to act.
51
C H A P T E R I V
52
DORCHESTER SAVINGS BANK-AN ANALYSIS
Introduction
The Dorchester Savings Bank is the seventh largest
thrift institution in Boston with total assets well over
$260 million. Critical to the importance of this institution
is the fact that it plays a major, if not the major, role in
the mortgage market in the Dorchester area of Boston.
Dorchester is a basic white working-class community
located on the edges or in the path of the expanding black
residential community. Its problems are typically those of
the inner-city neighborhood. Areas of Dorchester are
experiencing residential decline brought on by inadequacies
in the housing market, absentee-ownership, and racial
blockbusting. The purpose of this analysis is to examine
the role of the Dorchester Savings Bank in the housing
market and to understand how this particular bank helps
or hinders the neighborhood decay through its lending
policies.
Two sources of data were used in this analysis. The
first was the Annual Report of the Commisioner of Banks.
The second was information from the Suffolk County Registry
of Deeds. The information used included the identity of the
mortgagee and the mortgagor, the amount of the mortgage,
the sales price (if there was a sale), whether the loan was
FHAL or VA insured or guaranteed, and the address of the
property as well as that of the mortgagor (from this infor-
mation it could be determined which properties were absentee-
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owned and which had resident-owners).
Level of M,1ortgraeLendin,:
The Dorchester Savings Bank has long been a supporter
of the mcrtgage market. Three-fourths of its assets are in
real estate mortgage loans. 85 percent of those mortgages
(63 percent of total assets) are in in-state holdings.
These figures have remained constant throughout the growth
period from 1965 through 1971 and have continued through the
present time. Clearly, the Dorchester Savings Bank views
the mortgage loan as the most viable and desirable of
permitted investments. In this respect, it is a strong
supporter of housing markets. However, there are other
important considerations: 1) where the mortgaged properties
are located, 2) the identities of the martgagors, 3) the terms
of the mortgages, and 4) the types of mortgages. All of
these contribute to an understanding of the role a particular
institution plays in the mortgage market.
Table 1 offers many insights into the operation of the
Dorchester Savings Bank between 1970 and 1973. Most
important is the constant level of mortgage lending to
resident-owners in Dorchester. Even though the total
mortgage lending within the city of Boston varied from a
high of $11.4 million in 1972 to a low of $3.1 million
in 1970, the level of resident-owner mortgages in Dorchester
remained constant at $1.6 million. This suggest that the
bank has predetermined a level of lending for mortgages to
resident-owners that is free of influences made by changes
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TABLE I
DORCHESTER SAVINGS BANK-LENDING LEVELS
(in millions)
1970-1973
RESIDENT-0 WNER M'ORTGAGES
AREA 1970 1971 1972 1973
Dorchester 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Boston-core 0.0 .25 .26 .3
Other areas 95 .75 .65 1.46
of Boston
Total 2.55 2.6 2.51 3.36
ABSENTEE-OWNER MORTGAGES
Dorchester .46 1.55 .7 .5
Boston-core .02 2.55 6.8 2.3
Other areas
of Boston .09 .09 1.34 .3
Total .57 4.19 8.84 3.1
Total lending 3.12 6.79 11.35 6.46level
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in the market demand. One might call this a "public
relations level". Lending less than this level could leave
the bank particularly vulnerable to criticism that it was,
in fact, carrying out a policy of disinvestment within
Dorchester-a situation no officer of the bank would like
to have to defend. There is no need to lend above this
level since the banks underlying motivation is to provide
an out in the face of criticism-a task reasonably accomplished
by lending at the preset level. After it achieves this level,
the institution is free to invest in mortgages in other
areas where risks are lower or easier to analyze and/or
there is a chance for a greater return.
Analysis of the lending patterns of the South Boston
Savings Bank tend to support these findings. The South
Boston Savings Bank has approximately the same asset size
and experienced much the same level of growth throughout
the period examined. Table 2 indicates that this institution
has followed a pattern very much like that of the Dorchester
Savings Bank. It too, lends approximately $1.6 million to
resident-owners in the local area (South Boston, in this
case). This clearly supports the argument for a predetermined
"public relations" level of mortgage lending to resident-
owners in the local area.
The current level of investment in Dorchester for
resident-owner mortgages is slightly greater than .5 percent
of total assets per year. If the portfolio turns over every
10 years (it may even be much shorter) and the level of
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TABLE 2
SOUTH BOSTON SAVINGS BANK-LENDING LEVELS 1971-1973
(in millions)
RESIIDE NT-OWNER _MOR TGAGES
1971 1972 1973
South Boston 1.4 1.6 1.6
Dorchester ,87 .47 .39
Boston-core .06 .02 0.0
Other areas .28 .17 .34
of Boston
Total 2.61 2.26 2.33
ABSENTEE-0 WNER MORTGAGES
South Boston 1.16 4.48 1.97
Dorchester .65 .57 .28
Boston-core 7.18 4.71 2.99
Other areas 64 .4 11
of Boston
Total 9.43 10.16 5.35
Total lending 12.04 12.42 7.68
level
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investment in Dorchester remains constant, at most, 6
percent of the assets of the Dorchester Savings Bank will
be resident-owner mortgages in Dorchester. This is
certainly not a commendable level of support for a neighborhood
that has actively supported a thrift institution through most
of its existance, unless the mortgage demand in that area is
satiated. If we are to believe the statements of various
community groups like the Codman Square Civic Association,
It is clear that there has been no satiation of demand in
Dorchester.
There are several very important implications of this
policy. The first is that changes in the demand for- mortgages
in the Dorchester area may not be coupled with a corresponding
change in supply (if the change is towars increased demand),
at least with respect to the Dorchester Savings Bank.
Governmental attempts to make mortgages less risky in
Dorchester may, at most, have marginal effects. And finally,
an increase in the amount of money available for investment
may not necessarily be manefest by an increase in mortgages
on resident-owned property in Dorchester.
This same sort of commitment level tends to hold for all
resident-owned investments within the city. The total
mortgage level on these types of properties has remained at
or near $2.5 million from 1970 through 1972. The larger
investment in 1973 is due, in part, to a significant number
of condominium mortgages that were the result of a prior
commitment to a large developer. Consequently, the increase
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in 1973 is less a product of their internal lending policies
and more a result of the developers sales ability. Examination
of South Boston Savings Bank's lending levels again support
the theory of a predAtermined level.(see Table 2) South
Boston Savings Bank has a level of resident-owner lending
in the entire city that is very near the $2.5 million figure
established by the Dorchester Savings Bank.
It appears that changes in the level of available funds
are manefest in changes in the level of absentee commitment.
Consequently, efforts to increase the supply of mortgage funds
available to this bank may do little for the problems of the
resident-owner while providing significant support for
large absentee-owners.
Many areas of Dorchester are particularly ripe
for the various roles of the unscrupulous absentee-owner.
The opening of the new University of Mvlassachusetts campus,
with its influx of students and employees into the area, has
created a perfect enviornemnt for the speculator who buys
local property at inflated prices, hoping to make large,
quick profits either through resale or increased rents.
This occurs because the demand in such an area increases
at a much faster rate than the relatively stable supply and,
as a consequence, drives the prices up. Secondly, there
ar.e areas where "slumlords" are beginning to take their
tolls, bleeding the buildings and then abandoning them.
Finally, the racial blockbuster finds the fringes of the
expanding black population the perfect location for his
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activities. The actions of any of these and even those
of the more scrupulous absentee-owners often result in
severe neighborhood decline, Support of these activities
by fanancial institutions is an irresponsible action with
many severe repercussions on the local housing market.
Most important is the effect of the increased decay on
mortgage availability in the area. Lenders often support
absenteeism in an area and then refuse to make new mortgage
loans in the same area at a later date, citing increased
risks caused by neighborhood decay as the reason for their
action.
While it was relatively impossible to determine whether
any of the mortgages made by the Dorchester Savings 3ank
actually supported any of the above activities, it was
possible to determine whether a particular mortgage was
made to an absentee-owner or not. The result was some idea
of the level and type of support given absentee-owners.
From Table 1 it is clear that there is an active support
of absenteeism in the city. As could be expected, the largest
level of support occurs in the Downtown-Back Bay-South End
area of the Boston-core where most housing is absentee-
owned. The support of absenteeism is Dorchester, although
significant, is generally much less. Not only was there
evidence of this support in the total dollar amounts, but also
in the terms of the mortgages.
It was not uncommon for an absentee-owner to receive a
mortgage loan equal to or greater than 100 percent of the
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purchase price. This almost never happened to resident-
owners. Because of such actions, an absentee-owner can
purchase a property for $10,000 and receive a mortgage loan
for $15,000. Consequently, he gains title to the property
and almost $5000 in cash without having to risk any of his
own money, or for that matter to have any money of his
own. This crucial type of support gives the absentee-
owner an incredible degree of leverage, allowing him to
expand at a much more rapid rate than if he had to finance
significant protions of his purchases with equity capital.
(Note that.these are not mortgages for 150 percent of value
which are illegal, instead they are the result of the
absentee-owner's purchase at a rediculously low price or
receiving an unrealistically high appraisal for the mortgage
basis. It is interesting to note that only the absentee-
owner seems to be able to purchase at such bargain prices
or receive such inflated appraisals.)
Support of absentee-owners coupled with a limited level
of support for the resident-owner is indicative of the
support of neighborhood decay by an institution. Dorchester
Savings Bank, although to a much lesser degree than it
might, clearly support the forces that foster decline in
Dorchester's housing stock. It has set moderate limits on
the amount of resident-owner mortgage funds and at the same
time supported absentee-owners to a moderate degree in
Dorchester. However, it is not only important how much
money an institution allocates to absentee-owners, but also
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which absentee-owners it supports. Dorchester Savings
Bank's record has not been totally perfect in this respect.
An example of this is in its support of iv'ichael F. Kenealy
of Milton. Kenealy controls as many as ten realty trusts
in Dorchester.(57) Mlortgages for 100 percent of purchase
price and more were made to Mijo Realty Trust, Kenco Realty
Trust and Michael F. Kenealy, all names under which Kenealy
operates. The Dorchester Community News has printed a
series of articles exposing Kenealy's unscrupulous practices
of speculation and racial blockbusting in Dorchester.(58)
They feel very strongly that he poses a serious threat to
any neighborhood in which he operates. The support of
Keneally by the Dorchester Savings Bank is the support of
absenteeism at its lowest and most devastating level.
Redlininx
Just as crucial as support of absenteeism in an area is
the presence or absence of the bank policy of "redlining".
Here the lender draws a line around an area and refuses to
make mortgage loans within the line. The result is complete
destruction of the housing market within the area. No housing
can be bought, sold, or repaired due to the lack of mortgage
funds.
. Maps 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the geographic location of
properties mortgaged to the Dorchester Savings Bank during
each of the years from 1971 through 1973. These are
represented by dark-colored dots. The large shaded area on
the maps represents that part of Boston with a population
that is over 50 percent Black.
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MAP 1. Location of the properties within the
City of Boston mortgaged to the Dorchester
Savings Bank in 1971. The shaded area has a
predominately black population.
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2. Location of the properties within the
City of Boston mortgaged to the Dorchester
Savings Bank in 1972. The shaded area has a
predominately black population.
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WAP '. Location of the properties within the
City of Boston mortgaged to the Dorchester
Savings Bank in 1973. The shaded area has a
predominately black population.
65
Very few mortgages have been made by the Dorchester
Savings Bank in the predominately black area. While a large
portion of the shaded area (most of the lower half) lies in
or very near Dorchester, this bank has continued to make almost
no mortgages within that area. At the same time the bank
has made many mortgage loans in other sections of Dorchester,
often just outside the boundaries of the predominately black
populated area. This practice appears to become more pronounced
in each sucessive year. It appears that the Dorchester
Savings Bank has, in fact, "redlined" the area. This is
the most devastating action that a lender can take with
respect to an area. If other institutions follow these samre
policies, this community is destined to continued decline.
Without money, there is very little that can be done to
maintain the housing stock in the neighborhood. It is
these actions by the Dorchester Savings Bank that are most
threatening to the continued neighborhood viability in all
of Dorchester, As one neighborhood declines, so must those
immediately adjacent to it.
Branch Banking
The strength of the Dorchester Savings Bank is evidenced
by its rapid growth in the late 1960's. In the period between
1967 and 1971 the assets of the Dorchester Savings Bank grew
from $130 million to $250 million (or 92 percent), a rate of
growth unmatched by any other Boston thrift institution during
this period. The rate of growth declined to $12 million
in the next two years. The more rapid growth was due, in
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part, to an introduction of branch banking activities in the
downtown area of Boston and to the transfer of $50 million
in assets in conjunction with the merger of the Dorchester
Savings Bank and the Wildey Savings Bank. The first
downtown branch of the Dorchester was originally the office
of the Wildey Savings Bank. It is possible that the desire
to move into the downtown market was instumental in the
merger decision.
This growth of branch banking has critical implications
on the bank's role in Dorchester. It is common for neighborhood
thrift institutions in older urban areas to open branches in
the newer, more affluent areas of the city or suburbs.
These actions may be at the expense of the residents in the
older areas which gave them much of their economic viability
in earlier years. Not only do they open branches, but
occasionally they transfer the main branch to the newer
area. A clear example of this is Boston is the Charlestown
Savings Bank. It was founded in Charlestown in the 1850's.
In 1951 it opened a branch in the downtown and eventially
moved its main office to that location. Currently, it has
eleven offices with only one in Charlestown. In some
cases, thrift institutions have the power to close down
the original office in the older declining areas, leaving the
residents without the services of a local thrift institution.(59)
Even when they do not go to these extremes, branching may not
serve the best interests of the older neighborhoods. Although
there is very little conclusive data, it has been suggested
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that in many cases branching may facilitate the flow
of funds from the older, declining neighborhoods to the
newer, more viable areas.(60) It does this in two ways.
First, it provides easier access to the mortgage demand in
the "more desirable" lending area, Persons seeking a loan
initially check with those institutions where he is a
depositor and then those institutions with branches in
the neighborhood where the property is located. In this
manner, branch banking increases the demand for an institutions
available mortgage funds by those areas where risks are
often lowest. Secondly, branch banking may foster the
weakening of ties with an institutions original neighborhood.
There is no longer a dependence on the old area for the
institution's viability. The new areas may, in fact, be the
source of the majority of new deposit growth. As a consequence,
the institution is forced to change its loyalties. The
institution is such a situation, no longer dependent upon
the old area for economic strength, is free to act in a
manner that does anything but support its former lending
area. It no longer has to be afraid of policies that might
result in neighborhood decay. In short, the ability to
branch may have given financial institutions the opportunity
to ply the trade of the absentee landlord, "bleeding" the
area for all its worth and then abandoning it.
It is difficult to draw hard conclusions about the role
of branch banking in the operation of the Dorchester Savings
Bank. There is no information available concerning the
68
the location of depositors. Nor is there any easily
assessable data on the location of all mortgage loans made
by Dorchester Savings Bank. The data presented in the
earlier parts of this analysis tend to indicate that, while
not overwhelmingly positive, the effects of branching have
been much less drastic that those hypothesized. While
there has not been a wholesale write-off of the Dorchester
neighborhoods, it does appear that certain areas (mostly
those with large black populations) have been neglected.
The mortgage needs of the entire neighborhood are not
being satisfied before entering other markets. There has
also been some support of absenteeism, although not to the
degree that one would expect to accompany the serious decline
in a bank's relationship with its neighborhood.
The crucial question is whether increased dependence on
branch banking activities as well as other influencing
factors will contribute to an increase in those actions
by the Dorchester Savings Bank which are not in the best
interests of Dorchester. The answer is not clear. However,
the bank's selection of a level of resident-owner lending
may suggest that it is vulnerable to community pressure.
If this is the case, then the crucial task for those in
Dorchester who have a sincere hope for its future
have a clear cut task ahead.
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C HAP T E R V
CONCLUSION
The analysis in the foregoing chapters indicates
several critical points to be considered by those attempting
to modify the current roles and activities of thrift insti-
tutions in Boston's housing market.
First, there is the question of the level of action.
In most housing markets the flow of mortgage funds is
dominated by federally chartered savings and loan associations.
However, in Boston the large majority of potential mortgage
funds are held by the state chartered institutions. Consequently,
any action dealing with legislation and regulation must
originate on the state level. Massachusetts does not
have to wait for the federal government to solve many
of the problems arising from the actions of thrift institutions
in the mortgage market.
There is a second implication of the dominance of the
mortgage market by state chartered institutions. Federal
attempts to remedy problems in the mortgage market may
have only marginal effects in Massachusetts. Often the
federal government enacts policies that utilize federal
savings and loan associations and/or the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation in dominate roles. The relative small
contribution to the mortgage supply in Massachusetts made by
federal savings and loan associations dictates that any
change in the policies of these institutions can, at most,
make minor changes in the local market. Actions through
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation will also have little
effect in Massachusetts. With the exception of eight
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savings banks almost all state chartered institutions
insure their deposits through their own, state chartered
deposit insurance agency. The total amount of money
insured by FDIC (the deposits in all federal savings and
loan associations, as well as those in eight mutual savings
banks) are only a minor part of the total funds available
for mortgages.
An example of this is Presidents Nixon's program to
pump an additional $10.3 billion into the housing market,
announced on Mlay 10, 1974. Three billion dollars will be
available to only federal savings and loan associations.
Another $4 billion will go only to thrift institutions
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The final $3.3 billion is linked to the emergency housing
Tandem Plan that went into effect January 22, 1974. The
plan is designed to channel $6.6 billion into new construction
mortgage loans of $35,000 or less. It is clear that very
little of the first $7 billion will find its way into Mass-
achusetts due to the nature of her financial institutions.
One can speculate that very little of the $3.3 billion in
the Tandem Plan will enter the state either. The upper
limit of $35,000 may find that most of the new construction
in the state is too expensive to effectively utilize
the money.
Regulation
In the past the legislati ye ar egulatory process
have not been actively used to solve many of the problems
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associated with the mortgage market. The most important
effect of the legislation is that it provides a "grocery
list" of legal investments for these thrift institutions.
They includez types of loans, stocks, bands, government
securities, etc. The legislation also provides uoer
limits for investment in particular assets. Generally,
these upper limits are relatively useless since these
institutions almost never approach them. A more useful
type of limitation might be lower limits on certain
investments. However, one should be careful not to
over-restrict, rendering the regulated institution
inflexible, and, as such, slow to respond to crisis.
The most effective method of limiting and encouraging
investment has been through the tax laws. By effectively
increasing or decreasing the yield on certain investments
the state has significantly effected the portfolio
composition decision. An example of this is the investment
by Massachusetts banks in out-of-state FRA and VA mortgages.
The total investment by Massachusetts savings banks in these
assets as a percentage of total assets is much lower than
the investment by savings banks in other leading savings
bank states. Until it was appealed in 1966, Massachusetts
law allowed mortgages on property within the state to
be deducted from the amount of total deposits for certain
taxation purposes.(61) Consequently, yields on in-state
mortgages increased relative to those on properties
out of the Commonwealth. After its repeal, savings banks
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continued to maintain a lower investment in out-of-state
assets.
A second example of the effects of tax law on investment
portfolio concerns savings bank investments in government
securities. Massachusetts savings banks invest significantly
greater amounts in these as compared to corporate securities.
Deposits invested in government securities are exempt
from state deposit taxes. Consequently, they are much more
attractive than corporate securities for portfolio investment.
Although these two examples point to the sucesses of the
utilization of tax laws to promote certain desirable
investment policies, this may not always be the case.
Lenders do not have to invest in the less desirable mortgages.
As long as demand for lower risk mortgages is high and the
yield is sufficient, the effects of tax incentives may
be very small.
Regulation and legislation, alone, will not solve the
problems of urban housing markets. It is not enough to
require that an institution follow certain practices.
Incentives must be provided along with regulation. It is
clear that in the past the most effective attempts to
regulate have been those which were incentive-oriented.
i.e. tax laws. This sucessful practice should be continued.
Institutions must be encouraged not to look for the "loop
holes" in the regulations that they do not like. Potentially,
one of the most effective methods of control. of lending
institutions is this "carrots and sticks" policy. However,
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not only must we improve our incentives for action but we
must also make major changes in our general regulatory
approach.
Currently, in Massachusetts, the regulatory function of
the State Commissioner of Banks is performed with a minimum
of innovation. Examination of the regulations leaves little
doubt that their only purpose is to describe the "how to"
aspects of those things that the legislature allows banks to
engage in. Never are regulations utilized to encourage
solutions to various inadequacies in the mortgage supply.
Clearly, the use of regulatory power is untapped as to
its potential use to deal with many of the problems of the
housing market.
At this time, the most needed of all banking legislation
is a "Disclosure Law" such as Massachusetts House Bill 5597.
It would require that financial institutions disclose the
locations and levels of deposits and mortgage loans by
wards, towns, and cities.
Its power lies not in requiring the banks to do
certain things, but instead, in simply requiring them to
make public their actions and accept the consequences.
With such a law, the data for much of this thesis, rather
than taking months to collect, would have been part of the
public record. Currently, one of the largest problems
in dealing with issues like "redlining" and disinvestment
is the difficulty in obtaining concrete information to
document them. It is much easier for a bank to follow these
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policies if it knows that there is little chance that it
will have to answer publically for its actions.
In the past, public pressure has been used to encourage
banks to examine their lending policies. In Chicago, they
have been successful in getting the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board to do a study on disinvestment by savings and loan
associations.(62) A Minneapolis-St. Paul coilition of
community groups was able to increase central city lending
from $19 million to $85 million. It offered as an incentive,
a pledge of $2.3 million in new deposits.(63) In Boston,
the Codman Square Civic Association is attempting to pressure
the Dorchester Savings Bank into increasing its investments
in Dorchester. While many of the community groups have
had some successes, it is clear that such successes are
limited and that something more is needed. In many cases,
that something more is a "disclosure law". With it,
community organizations will have a factual basis for many
of their claims resulting in a stronger bargaining position.
With the law they will begin to be able to apply effective
pressure on the banks, the legislative body, and the regulatory
agency. This is where much of the key to success lies. The
root of all change must come from within the community
where the ultimate pressure for solutions and answers must
originate. Outraged citizens must voice their disapproval of
current banking policies. Bank officials must be called
upon to defend their actions. The decision to "redline" or
to support absentee owners must be as difficult as the
decision not to.
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